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PRESIDENTS, PREEMPTION, AND THE
STATES

Michele E. Gilman*
On May 20, 2009, President Obama issued a presidential
memorandum ordering federal agencies to strike preemption
language
from their
regulations
unless
there
is
"full
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and ...
a sufficient legal basis." 1 The memo was a rebuke to the Bush
Administration, which regularly inserted preemption provisions
into federal regulations, affecting areas such as health, consumer
safety, and the environment. As a result of federal preemption,
state laws could not be more protective than the federal
standard, and corporations were spared state tort lawsuits and
state regulatory regimes. For instance, the EPA preempted the
states from addressing climate change through limits on motor
vehicle emissions,2 the FDA decided that its approval of drug
labels preempted state tort lawsuits,3 and the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA") issued an
automotive door lock safety regulation preempting state law.4 In
each of these instances, the evidence suggests that the White
House had a hand in making these preemption decisions; they
were not solely the result of like-minded political appointees
coincidentally pushing preemption to further business interests.5

*
Professor of Law and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore
School of Law. B.A. 1990, Duke University; J.D. 1993, University of Michigan.
1. Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 384, at 1 (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/ 2009/DCPD- 200900384.pdf.
2. See infra notes 1 1 2-1 19 and accompanying text.
3. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 39 22, 3933 -3 6 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21
C. F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
4. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Door Locks and Door Retention
Components, Final Rule, 7 2Fed. Reg. 5385, 5397 (Feb. 6, 2007) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
571).
5. Regarding FDA preemption, see Alicia Mundy, FDA Memos Undercut Stance
on Pre-Empting Drug Suits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2008, http://online.ws j.
com/article/SB1 225 298 21388980687.html ("[T]he administration and White House
developed a strategy to use regulatory agencies to establish pre-emption."). Regarding
NHTSA, the American Association of Justice, an association of plaintiffs' side trial
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President Obama rested his memorandum on the values of
federalism, announcing that " [s]tate and local governments have
frequently protected health, safety, and the environment more
aggressively than
has
the
national
government. " 6
The
memorandum even reaches back in time; federal agencies must
review the last ten years of regulations to assess whether the
rules unj ustifiably preempt state authority.7 Not surprisingly, in
response to the Obama memo, consumer advocates cheered a
return to the "rule of law . . . over . . . the rule of politics, " while
business groups warned that companies would have "to navigate
a confusing, often contradictory patchwork quilt of 50 sets of
laws and regulations . "8 The Obama memo followed on the heels
of the Supreme Court' s decisions in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,9
holding that federal law did not preempt state smoking and
health lawsuits based on misleading labeling, and Wyeth v.
Levine, 10 holding that federal law did not preempt state tort
failure-to-warn lawsuits involving prescription drug labels
approved by the FD A. Shortly afterwards, the Court ruled in

Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n that federal regulations issued
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency did not
preempt state investigations of national bank lending practices. 11
The preemption winds have shifted.

President Obama has announced a stand against unjustified
preemption, and early . indications suggest that the memo is
impacting the output of federal agencies. For his part, President
Bush also touted states' rights, for instance, stating before his
inauguration: "I realize there's a role for the federal
government, but it's not to impose its will on the states and local
communities. " 12 However, his Administration's actions belied

lawyers, issued Freedom of Information Act requests to NHTSA that resulted in a series
of emails detailing how the Office of Management and Budget, an entity within the
Executive Office of the President, drafted the preemption language for NHTSA. See
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, GET OUT OF JAIL FREE: How THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION HELPS CORPORATIONS ESCAPE ACCOUNTABILITY (2008), available at
http://www. u
j stice.org/resources/Preemption _Rpt. pdf. Regarding climate change, see
infra notes 1 12-119 and accompanying text.
6. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1.
8. Philip Rucker, Obama Curtails Bush's Policy of 'Preemption,' WASH. POST, May
22, 2009, at A3 (quoting the American Association for Justice and Lisa Rickard, President
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform).
9. 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) .
10. 129 S. Ct. 1 187 (2009) .
11. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) .
12 . David Jackson, Bush Seeks GOP Governors' Help; President-Elect Says He Will
Try To Trim Federal Regulations on States, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2001, at 4A.
.
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this statement. 13 The preemption controversy is part of broader
debates about the values of federalism and how best to protect
them. On the one hand, the Tenth Amendment preserves state
autonomy by limiting federal power to that not reserved to the
states. On the other hand, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause
provides that the laws and treaties of the United States " shall be
the supreme law of the land . . . anything in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding," and courts
have placed few limits on Congress' lawmaking powers. Between
these foundational principles lies the preemption fault line.
Scholars have tracked preemption trends and disputes closely,
noting that w eemption is currently the "primary threat to state
autonomy. " 4 There is a lively debate as to whether the best
institutional actor to foster federalism is the courts, Congress, or
agencies. These scholars ask: who is the best actor to decide
whether a problem should be tackled at the federal or state level,
or both? Yet despite the centrality of modern Presidents to
preemption policy, the role of the President is all but ignored in
preemption scholarship. 15
This Article seeks to fill this gap by highlighting the role of
the President in federalism issues. As this Article makes clear,
the President can stifle or spur state innovation; foster or imperil
federal solutions to national problems. Given that federalism
values are enshrined in our constitutional system of government,
this Article argues that the President is a key player in ensuring
those values are fulfilled or undermined. Part I of the Article
examines official executive branch policies regarding preemption

and the extent to which those policies have been reflected in
agency actions. This Part concludes that recent Presidents (from
Reagan through Obama)16 do not demonstrate a philosophical
commitment to federalism, but use federalism rhetoric when it
supports their substantive policy aims. The danger is that states

13. See Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the
Transformation of American Conservatism, 37 PUBLIUS 279, 280 (2007) ( stating that Bush

was "routine ly dismissive of federalism concerns" ) .
14. Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 262 ( Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
15. A notable exception is John 0 . McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional
Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 902 (2001) ( arguing that presidential federalism orders are
necessary correctives for declines in federalism and tricameralism wrought by the
administrative state ) .
16. The Artic le focuses on these Presidents because President Reagan is credited
with strengthening presidential control over the regulatory state, a trend followed and
magnif ie d by his successors.
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may be misled into thinking their interests are being considered
by federal actors, when, in fact, they are not. In turn, this can
squelch state lobbying and limit opportunities for state
participation in federal decision-making. Part II responds to the
literature on institutional competence in federalism decision
making by placing the President within the debate. While most
scholars focus on comparing the relative virtues and vices of
agencies, courts, and Congress, this Part shows how the
President' s influence affects the attributes of these other actors.
Part II explains why congressional decision-making about
preemption is preferable to presidential preemption. However,
given the reality that Congress often does not or cannot address
preemption issues ex ante, this Part then examines how the
President can impact agency decision-making about preemption.
Part III explores ways in which the President can effectively
ensure a vibrant role for the states in federalism regimes, while
also preserving the benefits of centralized government by using
his Article II powers to direct agencies in a managerial, rather
than directive, role.
This Article assumes that a distribution of power between
the federal and state governments is desirable: the question is
who decides? A centralized approach, such as that fostered by
federal preemption, ensures uniformity, lessens compliance
costs, provides economies of scale, prevents a race to the bottom
by states seeking to attract businesses , and contains spillover
effects that arise when activity in one state crosses state lines. 17
Conversely, state autonomy preserves the states as policymaking
enclaves, allows the states to serve as laboratories of democracy,
supports problem-solving that reflects regional differences,
encourages citizen participation in an accessible level of
government, diffuses power, and serves as a restraint on federal
tyranny. 1 8 Preemption can limit these state-level benefits.1 9
Thus, deciding where to draw the line between federal and
state authority requires a balancing of the benefits and

17. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson , Preemption and Theories of
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 13, 18-19 (William W. Buzbee ed. , 2009).
18. See id. at 16-17.
19. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken , Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1304 ( 2009) ("Preemption is a problem when viewed through the lens of

uncooperative federalism not because it deprives states of the chance to regulate
separate and apart from the federal scheme , but because it pushes states to the edges of
national policymaking and reduces the number of ties that bind state and national
officials.").
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detriments of each sphere. Again, the issue is who draws this
line. This issue is complicated because regulatory power is not
neatly carved into separate federal and state layers. Most
regulatory programs are built upon a cooperative federalism
framework, where the federal and state governments exercise
concurrent
and
overlapping powers.2 ° For
instance,
in
environmental laws, Congress typically provides that federal
standards create a minimum floor, above which states can
regulate in a more protective manner.21 Likewise, in many public
benefits programs, federal funds flow to the states within some
broad parameters, but the states have considerable flexibility in
program administration, standard setting,
and eligibility
requirements. Sometimes, the relationship between the federal
and state governments is better described as uncooperative,
where " states use regulatory power conferred by the federal
government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal
law. "22 Preemption shifts all of these paradigms by creating a
ceiling, or a "unitary federal choice , " above which states may not
regulate.23 As a result, the " contested questions arise when state
law seeks to go further than federal law. "24 Given the United
States' regulatory system of cooperative and competing federal
and state relations, it is inevitable that presidential control over
federal agencies will have federalism implications.
I. PRESIDENTS AND FEDERALISM
Typically, Congress legislates with a broad brush and gives
specialized decision-making authority to executive agencies.25
There are several reasons for these statutory delegations to
agencies, ranging from the desire to have experts make
complicated, technical decisions to an attempt to push politically

20. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE:
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, supra note 17, at
33, 41 ("Since 1 937, overlapping state and federal regulation has become the norm, for
many, if not most, subjects. ").
21. See William W. Buzbee, The Benefits of Federalism's Institutional Diversity, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE
QUESTION, supra note 17, at 98, 101 ("Congress has repeatedly chosen to create
regulatory schemes that call on a role for federal, state, and sometimes even local
governments.").
22. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at 1259.
23. Buzbee, supra note 21, at 104.
24. Young, supra note 14, at 263.
25. See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 43-44
(4th ed. 2004).
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controversial decisions to the executive branch.26 With increasing
frequency, modern Presidents have asserted their authority to
guide agency decision-making, and even to mandate a particular
agency outcome. In turn, this directive authority can impact
federal-state relations. This Part discusses what Presidents have
said about federalism, and then compares their words to their
actions. In general, recent Presidents regularly talk about the

importance of power-sharing between federal and state
governments. However, they will disregard state interests that
conflict with their substantive policy goals. States can be
effective in lobbying for their interests with federal actors, but
only if they have adequate notice that their interests are at stake.
As this Part describes, presidential rhetoric about federalism can
mask inattention to state interests.
A. WHAT PRESIDENTS S AY ABOUT FEDERALISM
All Presidents since Ronald Reagan have maintained
official executive branch policies instructing federal agencies to

consider how their proposed federal actions impact the states.
Nevertheless, agencies regularly disregard these presidential
directives . The federalism executive orders are part of larger
pattern, emerging since the New Deal, in which Presidents have
steered and managed the output of federal agencies. During the

New D eal, President Roosevelt seized increasing control over
federal regulatory policy, an approach that President Reagan
revitalized by centralizing and coordinating agency output.2 7
President Clinton built on this foundation by directing
administrative agencies to implement his desired policies in lieu
of legislation.28 Today, " the innovation of 'Presidential
Government' is triumphant in America. "2 9 President George W.
B ush inherited and expanded upon these trends, using tools,
such as signing statements and executive orders, to further his
conception of the unitary executive,30 in which the President is at
the apex of the executive branch with the power to direct all

26. See id.
27. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 1 14 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277-81
(2001).
28. Id. at 2281-84.
29. David Gray Adler, The Condition of the Presidency: Clinton in Context, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 175, 176 (2002).
30. See Michael P. Allen, George W Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The
Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 872-74 (2007)
(describing actions taken by President Bush pursuant to broad assertions of executive
power).
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subordinate executive officers.31 Like his predecessors, President
Obama is using executive branch agencies to achieve his policy
obj ectives.
President Reagan was the first President to give regulatory
review teeth, by giving the White House enforcement authority
over the rulemaking process. Through executive orders,32 he
required federal agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis as part
of the rulemaking process, and he centralized review of all
regulations in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA" ), a unit within the Office of Management and B udget
(" OMB " ). These executive orders were partly designed to
"reduce the flow of bureaucratic power at the national level in
favor of greater state-level activities."33 Consistent with these
orders , President Reagan issued E . O . 12,612, which set forth
nine fundamental principles of federalism to guide agency
decision-making.34 These principles highlighted the limited scope
of the national government and the benefits of state sovereignty

in keeping government close to the people and maintaining
diverse policy preferences.35 Most significantly, E.O. 12,612
forbade preemption and displacement of state interests in the
absence of clear congressional intent.36
While President Reagan and his successor, President
George H.W. B ush, used regulatory review to pursue a
deregulatory agenda, President Clinton used his control over the
executive branch to achieve his polic objectives without having
r
to confront a Republican Congress.3 In E . O . 12,866, President
Clinton tweaked the Reagan cost-benefit analysis executive

order by requiring that agencies consider qualitative costs and
benefits in addition to
quantifiable
ones, as well as
"distributional impacts" and "equity, " and he expanded
3 1. See Christopher S. Yoo, Stephen G. Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 (2005).
32. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order

No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4 1985).
33. LARRY N. GERSTEN, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 86
(2007).
34. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 26, 1987).
35. Id. Additionally, President Reagan required that OMB resolve federal and state
disputes over federal grants and expenditures in consultation with state officials. Exec.
Order No. 12,372, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,959 (July 14, 1982).
36. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 34. Agencies were also required to consult
with state officials about policies that could displace state authority, prepare federalism
assessments of the impact of rules on federalism, and appoint officials within each agency
to ensure compliance with the federalism objectives. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note
34.
37. See Kagan, supra note 28, at 2248.
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regulatory review to the independent agencies.38 E.O. 12,866 also
gave a nod towards federalism; it encouraged federal agencies to
pursue non-regulatory alternatives and to seek the views of state
and local officials.3 9
President Clinton took federalism a step further in 1 993,
when he issued E . O .
12,875, entitled "Enhancing the
Intergovernmental Partnership , " which permitted states seeking
to avoid federal agency regulations to submit alternative policy
approaches to federal agencies , who then had to respond to state
requests within 120 days.40 However, on May 14, 1998, he
revoked this order, along with President Reagan's federalism
order, and he issued a new, controversial executive order on
federalism.4 1 E . O . 13,083 listed nine nonexclusive conditions,
under which federal agencies could displace state authority.42 For
instance, E . O . 13,083 permitted federal regulation to preempt
state authority if the matter involved an interstate concern that
was not contained within one state' s boundaries , if there was a
need for uniform standards, or if the federal government had
superior expertise.43 Unlike the Reagan order, there was no
presumption in favor of state sovereignty, no provisions limitin�
preemption, and no requirements for federalism assessments. 4
State and local governments responded with outrage , the
National Governor's Association voted in opposition to the
order, Congress convened hearings, and several congressmen
introduced bills that would mandate compliance with the
Reagan federalism order.45 In response , Clinton ended up
suspending his order, spending over a year consulting with maj or
organizations representing state and local governments, and
replacing the order with E . O . 13,132, which remains in effect
today.46

38. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
39. Id.
40. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 ( Oct. 26, 1993).
41. Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (May 1 9, 1998).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. For a detailed discussion of the differences between the Reagan and Clinton
orders, see David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Blueprints for Change,
Devolution and Subsidiarity in the United States and the European Union, in THE
FEDERAL VISION 1 18, 125-31 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) ; Jennie
Holman B lake, Note, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A Modern Debate
Over Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 BYU L. REV. 293, 308-18 (2000) .
45. See B lake, supra note 44, at 300-02; see also David S. Broder, Executive Order
Urged Consulting, but Didn't; State, Local Officials Want Federalism Say, WASH. POST,
July 16, 1998, at Al5.
46. See B lake, supra note 44, at 294.
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E . O . 13,132 is very similar to the Reagan order, although it
does not require " clear and certain" constitutional authority to
justify federal action.47 In general, E . O . 13,132 requires an
agency to identify constitutional and statutory authority before it
limits the policymaking discretion of the states , and to consult
with state officials whenever federal agency action has
federalism implications .48 The order permits preemption only
when the statute explicitly permits it, where congressional intent
is otherwise clear, or where the exercise of state authority is
inconsistent with statutorily required federal action.49 In any
event, preemption must "be restricted to the minimum level
necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute. "50 Moreover,
agency rules must contain a federalism summary impact
statement that describes consultation efforts with state and local
governments and the effect of the regulation on state authority.51

Finally, agencies must appoint an official to ensure and certify
agency compliance with the order. 52 As with most executive
orders, E . O . 13,132 has no enforcement mechanism, does not
cre�te grivate rights of action, and is not subject to j udicial
review.
President George W. B ush left E . O . 13,132 intact.s4
Nevertheless, agency officials in his administration regularly and
aggressively preempted state law as part of a coordinated
strategy to limit state authority over tort actions.ss This strategy
was
consistent with President Bush's
centralization of
presidential control over the executive branch; for instance, he
also issued an executive order that placed a presidential
appointee within each agency who was in charge of developing
and approving regulations.s6 President Obama inherited these
executive orders , and the preemption memo is j ust one of many

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) .
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 552 (2005)

("Contemporary executive orders routinely disclaim any intention to create any right of
enforcement either against the government or against private individuals.").
54. In addition, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum on February 26,
2001, establishing an interagency working group on federalism, but there is no evidence
the group ever convened, or that the memo had an impact on any decision-making. See
Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W Bush
A dministration, 37 PUBLIUS 432, 436 (2007).
55. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 4-5 (2008).
56. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2703 (Jan. 18, 2007).
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presidential

Even before issuing the memorandum, Obama had
expressed solicitude for state interests, telling the National
Governor's Association, in December 2008, that "a single
courageous state" can "serve as a laboratory experimenting with
innovative solutions to our economic problems, " and promising
to work with the states together "in partnership. "57 Obama also
invited the governors to his first state dinner in February 2009,
stating that his " goal and aim is to make sure that we are making
life easier, and not harder, for you. "58 In the preemption
memorandum, he committed these principles to writing. Obama
began by stating that, in recent years, despite E . O . 13,132,
federal agencies "have sometimes announced that their
regulations preempt State law . . . without explicit preemption by
the Congress or an otherwise sufficient basis under applicable
legal principles. "5 9 From now on, he announced, preemption will
occur only with legal j ustification and consideration of state
interests. 60 The memorandum reminds the executive branch that
the "citizens of the several States have distinctive circumstances
and values" that require respect. 61 To further these values, the
memorandum forbids agencies from including preemption
provisions in regulatory preambles without notice and comment
(a common tactic under the B ush Administration), permits
preemption only in accord with E . O . 13,132, and requires agency
heads to review the last ten years worth of regulations containing
preemption provisions, reassess them, and amend them if
necessary. 62 In short, the memorandum is designed to
reinvigorate E. 0. 13,132. The following Part addresses the
impact these presidential directives have had on actual policy.
B. WHAT PRESIDENTS DO ABO UT FEDERALISM
Presidents regularly speak of respect for state interests, and
the executive orders exemplify that rhetoric. However,
presidential actions do not necessarily adhere to these federalism

57. John Dinan & Shama Gamkhar, The State of American Federalism 2008-2009:
The Presidential Election, the Economic Downturn, and the Consequences for Federalism,
39 PUBLIUS 369, 373 (2009) .
58. Id.
59. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1 .
60. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1 .
6 1 . Memorandum o n Preemption, supra note 1 , a t 1 .
62. Memorandum o n Preemption, supra note 1 , a t 1 .
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statements. Rather, on issues affecting state interests, recent
Presidents appear driven more by policy objectives than by any
philosophical commitment to federalism. 63 To begin with,
agencies have rarely complied with the federalism executive
orders, and Presidents have not enforced those orders . 64 This is
problematic because federal agencies can disregard or remain
ignorant of state interests, fail to solicit state input, and alienate
the very state officials who will be tasked with implementing a
federal statutory scheme . At the same time, this disregard can
weaken agency analysis of regulatory options and impacts.
Respect for federalism does not mean that state interests should
always trump federal interests;
rather, it requires fair
consideration of and deliberation about state interests. Those
are the stated goals of E . O . 13,132; those goals have never been
controversial.
During the Reagan Administration, agencies did not
implement the federalism executive order and OMB was
indifferent. 65 Subsequently, a 1999 GAO study found that
agencies had issued 1 1,000 final rules in a two year period
between 1 996 and 1 998, but prepared only five federalism impact
statements. 66 Professor Nina Mendelson followed up on the
GAO study and examined agency output during one quarter of
2003, finding only six federalism impact analyses in over 600
proposed and final rulemaking documents. 67 Those six analyses
were of low quality, "failing to analyze state interests in
providing additional protection for residents, state autonomy, or
any of the other federalism values. " 68 Mendelson also examined

485 proposed
2006.69 Of this

and final rulemaking documents issued in May
group, six rulemakings had a preemptive effect on

63. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minoritv Poor:
AccountinR for the Tvrannv of State Maiorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 568-69 (1999)
("That federalism is often used as a stalking-horse for other substantive ends is at least
suggested by the lack of consistency among many would-be federalists. Modern
devolutionists who embrace the traditional defenses of federalism can also be found
supporting nationalization of tort liability rules in ways explicitly designed to reduce the
autonomous authority of the states.").
64. See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 44, at 131.
65. See Blake, supra note 44, at 318.
66. See Federalism: Implementation of Executive Order 12,612 in the Rulemaking
Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues),
available at www.gao.gov/archive/1 999/gg99093t.pdf.
67. Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 695, 719 (2008).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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state laws, but only three concluded that a federalism impact
statement was required, and only three indicated a special effort
by a federal agency to contact affected state agencies for input.70
Clearly, the executive orders have historically had little effect on
agency proce d ures. 71
At the same time, presidential policy preferences have had
varying impacts on state autonomy. In general, Republican
Presidents have been more interested in a deregulatory agenda,
while Democrats see the executive branch as a tool for
implementing an activist policy agenda.72 As two federalism
scholars have explained, "we have frequently encountered
situations in recent years in which liberals have rushed to defend
the authority of states to prosecute activist policies, while
conservatives in Congress and the B ush Administration
promoted national preemption of activist state laws. "73 Both
approaches have consequences for federalism and preemption,
as a comparison between Presidents Clinton and B ush reveals.

1.

President Clinton

During the Clinton Administration, federal agencies
generally took a narrow view of preemption and did not seek to
preempt state common law claims.74 Moreover, despite the heat
he took over the botched federalism executive order, President
Clinton is acknowledged to have been generally attentive to the
interests of states and localities.75For instance, in 1 993, President
Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting agencies from
imposing unfunded mandates on the states, and he signed
codifying legislation into effect two years later.76 In social welfare
programs, his Administration granted states waivers to
experiment with programs such as Medicaid and welfare.77 Then,

70. Id.
71. See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 44, at 131.
72. See Kagan, supra note 28, at 2315-16.
73. Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 293.
74. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 153-54. When states objected to a proposed
rule by the Federal Railway Administration that would have preempted state common
law cases against railroads based on a failure to warn at railway crossings, the FRA
backed down and limited the scope of the preemption. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at
153-55.
75. See Brian E. Bailey, Note, Federalism: An Antidote to Congress's Separation of
Powers Anxiety and Executive Order 13,083, 75 IND. L.J. 333, 338 (2000).
76. See id.
77. See John Kincaid, The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis,
31 PUBLIUS 1, 21 (2001) . Kincaid also notes that waivers have downsides; they can
"jeopardize the integrity of the rule of law and potentially enhance executive power over
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over vehement liberal objections, he pushed for and signed
welfare reform legislation that devolved discretion over welfare
programs to the state and local levels and encouraged state
waivers and experimentation.78

2.

President George W. B ush

Like President Clinton, President B ush had policy
obj ectives that he could not get Congress to enact, and he used
his executive branch toolbox to achieve his ends. For President
Bush, a prime goal was tort reform,7 9 and he appointed several
industry lawyers and executives as agency officials in order to
implement this strategy. Soon, his Administration began to file
amicus briefs in state tort litigation, arguing that federal law
preempted state common law claims . 8 ° For instance, the Bush
Administration argued in legal briefs that ERISA preempted a
Texas statute (previously signed into law by B ush as governor);
that EPA-approved pesticide labels preempted state common
law claims, and that FDA approval of medical devices and drug
labels preempted state common law claims. 8 1 Agencies then
began inserting preemption language into regulatory preambles,
thereby evading notice and comment requirements on the
preemption issue . 82 This meant that states had no opportunity to
comment on proposed standards, and were blindsided when
those standards were announced. Examples of this "preemption
by preamble" occurred in NHTSA's SUV roof safety standards,
CPSC's mattress flammability standards, and FDA's drug
labeling approvals. 83
Many of these preemption policies were complete reversals
of prior agency positions and were "largely hidden from public
view, " 8 4 a practice termed "backdoor federalization. " 85 Unlike

legislative power," and "pose issues of democratic accountability insofar as they are
negotiated and implemented by executive officials outside of floodlit legislative
processes." Id. at 22.
78. See Cashin, supra note 63, at 568-574.
79. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 281-82.
80. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 154.
81. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 154.
82. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 228 ( 2007 ) .
83. Id. at 227.
84. Id. at 252 n.127 ( quoting Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush
Administration's Aggressive Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, CENTER
FOR PROGRESSIVE REG., Oct., 2004, http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
preemption. pdf).
85. Id. at 228. These preambles were accused of "limiting the extent to which
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President Clinton, who relished the regulatory limelight and
claimed agency initiatives as his own, President B ush achieved
his regulatory initiatives with more stealth. Nevertheless, as Jay
Lefkowitz, Bush's domestic policy advisor, told The Wall Street
Journal, " [t]he use of rulemaking to protect corporations from
product liabilit
was discussed from early in the B ush
�
administration. " 6 Even in President Bush's last weeks in office,
the Administration was fast-tracking regulations that would
preempt product safety lawsuits in a race before the Obama
Administration took over. 87 The divide between presidential
rhetoric and agency action meant that states were unable to
advocate effectively for their interests ; indeed , that was the goal
of preemption by preamble.
Overall, President B ush was " routinely dismissive of
federalism concerns and frequently an agent of centralization,"
in a way that marked a departure from prior Republican
Presidents . 8 8 Further, although President B ush "never made
federalism prominent on his agenda, his policies have had
substantial intergovernmental impacts. " 8 9 For instance, he used
his executive powers to reform social service delivery, requiring
federal agencies and states to include faith-based organizations
in governmental contracting. 90 During his terms in office, states
were upset at limits on their autonomy imposed by President
Bush's legislative initiatives, such as: the No Child Left B ehind
Act, standardizing public educational goals; the REAL ID Act,
mandating state driver' s license requirements; and the Help
America Vote Act of 2002, imposing national election
requirements on states. 91 States also chafed at federal budgetary
reductions in health, education, and welfare programs. 92 Finally,
intergovernmental relations were strained in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, as the federal

information about the process of decision making is available to the public." Holly
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1601,
1632-33 (2008).
86. Alica Mundy, Bush Rule Changes Could Block Product-Safety Suits, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 2008, at Al l .
87. Id.
88. Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 280.
89. John Kincaid & Richard L. Cole, Public Opinion on Issues of Federalism in
2007: A Bush Plus?, 38 PUBLIUS 469, 481 (2008).
90. See Michele E. Gilman, If at First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order:
President Bush and the Expansion of Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1103 (2007).
91. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 292.
92. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 283.
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and state governments struggled to respond to these crises
without clear parameters for responsibility or accountability. 93
Thus, despite having identical formal policies regarding
preemption, the Clinton and B ush Administrations impacted
state autonomy quite differently.

3.

President Obama

Obama's preemption memorandum is his formal statement
on federalism, but of course , actions speak louder than words.
Early on, consumer advocates were unhappy when the Obama
Administration maintained a B ush-era preemption position
before the Supreme Court in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n.94
In Cuomo, the New York Attorney General sent letters to
several national banks requesting information about their
lending practices, in order to see whether they violated New
York's fair lending laws . 95 The Attorney General was
investigating "why some national banks seemed to be making a
disproportionate number of high-interest home mortgage loans
to black and Hispanic borrowers. " 96 The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ( " O CC " ) and a banking trade
association brought suit to enjoin the information request,
arguing that OCC regulations issued pursuant to the National
B ank Act preempted state information gathering from national
banks . 97 Despite the entreaties of consumer and civil rights
groups,
the
Obama
Administration
adopted
the
Bush
Administration position that the O CC's preemption decision
deserved Chevron deference - a position that a sharply divided
Supreme Court rejected. 9 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
held that the OCC regulation was an attempt to " exempt
national banks from all state banking laws, " in violation of the
plain language of the statute. 9 9
Although public interest advocates were disappointed in the
Obama Administration's position, they chalked it up to a lack of
time to reverse course (Obama appointee Elena Kagan was
93. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 280-81.
94. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
95. Id. at 2714.
96. John Schwartz, Bank Regulation Case Pits U.S. Against States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2009, at B3.
97. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714.
98. See Greg Stohr, Obama Backs Banks; Seek To Block Fair Lending Probe,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087 &sid=aCdEKiwbiPzQ.
99. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2720.
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sworn in as Solicitor General a week before the oral argument)
and the continued leadership of a Republican appointee at
OCC. 100 These explanations may indeed have been accurate; the
Obama Administration has since proposed regulations in-line
with the goals of consumer and civil rights groups, permitting
state enforcement of predatory lending laws.1 0 1 Moreover, the
Administration has backed away from some prior litigation
positions. On April 28, 2009, the Department of Justice wrote

the Third Circuit to withdraw a previously submitted amicus
brief that argued for preemption of state failure-to-warn claims
based on drug labeling in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.102 The case is
on remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light of
the Court' s decision in Wyeth v. Levine.103
Public interest discontent arose again at the end of 2009,
when the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(" OIRA"), the executive office within OMB that reviews

regulations, brought in a conservative economist from the FDA
on a temporary civil service detail.1 04 The economist had a history
of challenging the data behind environmental and public health
regulations, and while at FDA, he defended federal preemption
of medical product regulation. 105 Professor Rena Steinzor,
President of the Center for Progressive Regulation, called the
personnel decision " discouraging to those hopeful that the

Obama Administration will fulfill its many commitments to
revitalize the agencies responsible for rotecting public health,
p
worker safety, and natural resources. " 10 OMB defended the hire
as a good fit for a civil service position in an office that was
"stretched" , and noted that the economist was hired to conduct
analysis and had "no decision-making role." 107

100. See Stohr, supra note 98.
101. See Greg Stohr, Banks Must Face State Enforcement, U.S. Court Says,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=ah4s56vtWoOA.
102. Letter from Sharon Swingle, Appellate Staff, United States Dep't of Justice, to
Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, United.States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. 28,
2009), available at http://druganddevicelaw.net/DOJ%20Letter.pdf.
103. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem. ) .
104. See OMB Watch, New OIRA Staff Calls Attention to Office's Role, Dec. 8, 2009,
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10621; Juliet Eilperin, Official Questions Pollution
Proposal; OMB Says Views of Economist on Rule are 'Irrelevant,' WASH. POST, Dec. 4,
2009, at Al5.
105. See OMB Watch, supra note 104.
106. R e n a S t e i n z o r , Sunstein Watch: Randall Lutter to OIRA , C P R
B L O G, D e c . 2 , 200 9 , http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
50229EA2-F753-A87A-B78036364E23EAB8.
107. See Eilperin, supra note 104.
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D espite these mixed signals, several agencies have issued
regulations that disavowed preemption positions previously
taken during the B ush Administration, demonstrating a renewed
attention to federalism at the agency level. In May 2009,
NHTSA issued a final rule regarding SUV roof crush resistance
that deleted preemption language previously contained in the
Bush-era proposed rule . 10 8 Similarly, in December 2009, NHTSA
granted a petition for reconsideration of a final rule regarding
safety standards for vehicle seating and agreed to remove "the
portion of the regulatory text stating that State tort law
requirements are preempted" in light of the fact that any
federal-state conflict was unlikely. 10 9 The agency conducted a
detailed analysis of preemption and savings provisions in the
governing statute, as well as in court decisions, and also noted
that it had " contacted organizations representing interests of
State and local governments and officials about the rulemaking, "
none o f whom had comments o n the rule. 110 Likewise, the Mine
Safety and Health Administration announced in a correction to
a final rule involving safety for underground trapped miners that
it had re-analyzed the rule in accordance with the presidential
memorandum and was rescinding a preamble that purported to
preempt private tort litigation.111
The most significant preemption reversal, thus far under
President Obama, involved EPA's decision to grant California a
long-sought waiver to regulate motor vehicle emissions. The
Bush Administration continuously sowed uncertainty over the
causes and consequences of climate change warming; the result
was
a
non-re ulatory
approach
that
limited
state
¥
experimentation. 11
To the consternation of the scientific
community, the White House suppressed and edited portions of
EPA reports that linked global warming to human activity. 113
108. 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348, 22,349 (May 12, 2009) (codified at 49 C. F.R. pts. 571, 585)
("We do not foresee any potential State tort requirements that might conflict with
today's final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption."). In
its analysis of the comments to the proposed rule, NHTSA noted that it received
"numerous comments,'' id. at 22,359, on the possible preemptive effect of the rule,
including one "signed by 27 State Attorneys General and the National Conference of
State Legislatures," id. at 22,354.
109. 74 Fed. Reg. 68,185, 68,186 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 49 C. F.R. pt. 571).
110. Id. at 68,188-89.
1 1 1 . 74 Fed. Reg. 61531 (Nov. 25, 2009) (codified at 30 C. F.R. pts. 7, 75).
112. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change- The New "Superwhale" in the Room:
International Whaling and Climate Change Politics-Too Much in Common?, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 753, 771 (2007).
1 13. See Jeremy Symons, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July
13, 2003, at B4; Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seeyle, Report by E.P.A . Leaves out
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The Bush Administration's position-even in the face of
"unequivocal"
evidence of ¥lobal warming
by leading
international scientific bodies 11 -lead to a battle between
California and the federal government over motor vehicle
emissions. By its terms, the Clean Air Act (" CAA") preempts
state regulation of motor vehicle emissions, but allows California
to seek a waiver from the EPA if certain statutory requirements
are met. 1 15 If the waiver is granted, other states can adopt
California's standards, and over the forty year history of the
CAA, EPA granted many such waivers to deal with local air
pollution. 116 In July 2002, the California legislature passed a
statute requiring automakers to reduce vehicular emissions from
all cars sold in the state, and, in 2005, California sought a waiver
from EPA to implement the legislation. 1 17 Sixteen states
subsequently indicated their intent to adopt California's
standards, 118 but, in D ecember 2007, EPA denied California the
waiver needed to implement its laws, contending that the state
law was preempted by the need for uniform federal standards . 119

Frustrated, many states worked to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in other economic sectors. By mid-2007, seventeen
states had implemented targets for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions through various laws, regulations, and executive
orders. 12 ° California Governor Schwarzenegger issued an

Data on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al; SETH SHULMAN,
UNDERMINING SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 22-24 (2008).
1 14. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global
Warming ls 'Unequivocal,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al (noting that the report asserted
with more than 90% confidence that human-caused greenhouse gases have been the
major source of global warming in the past 50 years).
115. See Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate
Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Clv. RTS. L. REV. 443, 456 (2008). This California-only waiver
provision was included when the CAA was enacted in 1967 in light of California's severe
air pollution problems and the state's leading efforts to reduce pollution. See id. at 456.
1 16. See id. at 456-57.
1 17. See id. at 454.
1 18. See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When There is an
"Emerging Consensus" of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 649,
650 (2008).
1 19. See Adler, supra note 1 15, at 457-58. Adler notes that there was "ample
statutory basis" for the EPA position. Adler, supra note 1 15, at 458; see also Nina A.
Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Interpretation:
A Response To Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE L.J. 2157, 2165-66 (2008)
(arguing that EPA failed to consider federalism concerns, such as "the value of state
experimentation given California's history of regulating air pollution").
120 See Kevin L. Doran, US. Sub-Federal Climate Change Initiatives: An Irrational
Means To a Rational End?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 89, 209 (2008) (noting that states have
acted via several methods, including executive orders, legislation, and press releases);
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executive order mandating a reduction in the state's greenhouse
gas emissions,121 while the California legislature passed the
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 through a mix of market
measures, incentive systems, and direct controls over energy
producers.122 Twenty-eight states demanded that utilities provide
a specified percentage of consumer electricity from renewable
energy sources . 1 23 States also banded together in various regional
coalitions committed to emission caps on stationary sources of
air pollution.124 Finally, twelve states and several cities turned to
the federal j udiciary and successfully sued EPA over its failure
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.125
The lawsuit culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that EPA failed to make a
reasoned j udgment when it refused to regulate greenhouse
gases, which the Court held are covered by the CAA.126 Thus,
states used both their executive and legislative powers, as well as
the federal j udiciary, to overcome the B ush Administration's
anti-regulatory and pro-preemption climate change policies.

During his presidential campaign, Senator Obama promised
that, if elected, he would reverse B ush's environmental policies
and make the United States a global leader in tackling climate
change. As President, most of his promised change has come
through agency regulations, as Congress remains stalled on
climate change legislation.121 In April 2009, EPA issued an
endangerment finding that greenhouse gases "threaten the
public health and welfare of current and future generations; " the
finding clears the way for substantive regulations. 1 2 8 In May 2009,
President Obama held a Rose Garden ceremony surrounded by
the Governors of California and Michigan, as well as auto
industry executives, in which he announced that EPA and the
Learner, supra note 1 18, at 650.
121. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response To Global Climate Change: What
Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 53 (2007 ) .
122. See id. at 55, 58. The states are also suing various industries under a nuisance
theory. Id. at 91-93.
123. See Learner, supra note 1 18, at 650, 652.
124. See Kaswan, supra note 121, at 58.
125. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549·u.s. 497 ( 2007 ) .
126. Id. at 528, 533-34.
127. Steven Mufson & David A. Fahrentold, EPA is Preparing To Regulate Emissions
in Congress' Stead, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2009, at Al.
128. 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63 ) ; see
John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Path To Regulate Heat-Trapping Gases for First Time in the
U.S. , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A15. See generally 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63 ) (providing the final rule).
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D epartment of Transportation ("D OT" ) would commence j oint
rulemaking to set a national fuel economy and greenhouse gas
standard that would significantly increase mileage requirements
for cars and trucks . 12 9 The automakers signed on to the effort
because they preferred a uniform federal standard to various
levels of state regulation. 130 This is a situation in which both
industry and environmental advocates favor federal preemption.
Industry prefers a uniform standard to minimize production
variations across states, while environmentalists believe that
climate change is best tackled at national and global levels
because greenhouse gases are not contained regionally. This

example shows that preemption is not necessarily harmful to
state interests; rather, respect for federalism gives states a voice
in federal decision-making. In June 2009, EPA granted
California's waiver request, and California agreed to comply
with a new federal standard. 131 In September 2009, the EPA and
D OT issued the proposed motor vehicle emissions rules, which
would constitute the biggest increase in gas mileage standards in
history. 1 32 With these new proposals , President Obama directed
executive agencies to take action to protect the climate, but left
the scientific determinations to agency staff.
Of course, preemption is only part of the federalism trends
under the Obama Administration. President Obama took office
during a time of extreme financial distress. This may drive a shift
from states as "primary innovators on many policy issues" to
"renewed attention to federal policy-making, " because the
federal government may be the only actor with the capacity and
resources to respond to the economic crisis. 1 33 At the same time,
Obama has been responsive to state fiscal interests through his
support for federal stimulus funds that flowed to the states for
programs, such as Medicaid, education, and infrastructure.134 In
turn, this has resulted in some state backlash. Several Governors
announced that they would refuse federal stimulus money
because they feared that unfunded mandates would result when
129. See Steven Mufson, New Auto Standards vs. Old U.S. Preferences; Mileage Rules
To Add To Price, Shrink Engines, WASH. POST, May 20, 2009, at Al4.
130. Id.
131. 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009).
132. 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537, 538).
Later that month, EPA moved forward with proposed rules to regulate emissions from
power plants and industrial facilities. See John M. Broder, E.P.A. Proposes New
Regulations On Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at Al.
133. Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 57, at 369; see also Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note
57, at 378-79.
134. See Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 57, at 374-75.
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the federal funding ended. 135 Nevertheless, these Governors
either ended up accepting almost all the available funds , or their
state legislatures overturned their refusals.136 Similarly, after the
passage of health care reform, a priority for the President, some
states banded together to challenge the law's constitutionality.
These shifting state alliances demonstrate that it is impossible to
talk about state interests as a monolith. 137 Indeed, it is the states'
capacity for diverse viewpoints that is one of the supposed
benefits of federalism. If the federal government ignores or
squelches this diversity, federal policymaking can suffer as result.
II. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
An extensive body of literature on preemption focuses on
which institutional actor is best positioned to divide up federal
and state regulatory authority: Congress , federal agencies, or the
courts. Congressional supporters stress the political safeguards
of federalism inherent in the role of states in federal elections.
Agency advocates argue that rulemaking processes allow states
to provide input to agencies that is then weighed by the
regulatory experts in a particular field. The court cohort believes
only j udges have the competence to take a broad view of how to
uphold federalism principles. And each camp has strong
critiques of its competitors: Congress 's collective action hurdles
undermine federalism values; agencies are too specialized to
understand abstract values of federalism; and courts should
respect the decisions of the political branches, which have the
expertise to assess the real-world effects of regulatory programs.
Regardless of the validity of these competing viewpoints, they
fail to take into account how the President influences, impacts,
and compares to each of these actors.
As Part I shows, Presidents impact the federalism balance,
sometimes dramatically. Yet, at most, the current debate
acknowledges that the President is the head of the agencies, thus
giving the agencies democratic accountability. However, this
probably assumes too much, as discussed below. This Part puts

135. See Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 57, at 375; Shaila Dawan, 6 Governors May
Reject Portions of Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A12.
136. See Dinan & Gamhkar, supra note 57, at 375; Mike Stuckey, When Officials
Reject Stimulus Funds, Sparks Fly; Communities Split Over Attempts To Forgo Recover
Act Money, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34382454.
137. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 22 (2009) (explaining that some state
interests are universally shared, while others may be categorical or particularistic) .
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the President in center stage to assess how he compares to
Congress, agencies, and the courts in protecting federalism. This
Part aims to help answer the question: what role should
Presidents play in preemption decisions? This Part concludes
that it is preferable for Congress, rather than the President, to
make
preemption
decisions
because
Congress
is
more
transparent and deliberative than a unitary decision-maker.
Thus, a presumption against preemption would promote greater
opportunities for input by states. Still, because agencies make
most preemption decisions, it is necessary to consider how
presidential involvement impacts agency processes. The short
answer is that it depends on the President.
A. CONGRESS COMPARED TO THE PRESIDENT
Most commentators promote Congress as the superior
institutional actor for protecting state interests. 13 8 At the same
time, there is widespread acknowledgment that Congress 's
potential is unfulfilled because it often does not expressly
address whether its statutes g reempt state law, or does so in a
manner that is ambiguous . 1 Thus, many scholars support a
presumption against preemption, enforced vigorously by courts,
that would require Congress to speak clearly if it wants to
preempt state law. In this view, the presumption against
preemption would foster deliberation by a democratically
accountable branch, result in carefully considered preemption
decisions, and comport with primary constitutional principles. 140

138. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, supra
note 17, at 192, 193 (stating that the presumption can "play a useful role in implementing
the Constitution's political and procedural safeguards of federalism"); Young, supra note
14, at 249, 267 ("Constitutionally based limitations should ensure that the power to
preempt state law remains with Congress." ) ; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 7
(2007 ) (" [S]pecific action from Congress o n specific legislation can mobilize public
opinion, thus diminishing the tyranny of the status quo.").
139. See Hills, supra note 138, at 9 ( " [T]he federal lawmaking process has some
notorious defects, which prevent it from addressing broad policy issues such as the
desirability of decentralization."); Sharkey, supra note 82, at 215 ("Congress punts on the
key question.").
140. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis With the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 21 1 1 , 2134 (2008) ("We
contend that the Constitution requires that the central decision to preempt state law be
meaningfully traceable to Congress - not simply to the will of the agency itself. This flows
from the structure of the Constitution."). Such a presumption would also put the onus on
well-financed regulated industries to lobby for and obtain preemption, rather than on
more diffuse public interest groups that are less capable of organizing to obtain express
savings clauses. See Hills, supra note 138, at 28.
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Nevertheless, the reality is that most preemption decisions
are made by agencies,141 and that the President, as head of the

executive branch, is directing and/or coordinating some of these
outcomes. Thus , advocates of the pro-Congress position need to
articulate why a presumption against preemption would be
preferable to agency decision-making, particularly with the
additional layer of presidential involvement. In tum, this
requires a comparison of congressional and presidential
incentives to protect state autonomy. If we compare Congress
and the President along the benchmarks of accountability,
transparency,
and deliberation-"the classic elements of
representational
democracy" 142-it
becomes
clear
that
Congress 's main advantages flow from the deliberative and
transparent nature of its processes, and that, with regard to
accountability, both of the federal political branches share
similar incentives where the states are concerned. In the end,
both Congress and the President fluctuate in their solicitude for
state interests, usually for reasons tied to substantive policy
goals.

1.

Accountability

The pro-Congress position rests on the "political safeguards
of federalism, " a theory set forth by Herbert Wechsler in a
prominent 1954 law review article where he stated that "the role
of the states in the composition and selection of the central

government" preserves state autonomy. 143 Not only are members
of Congress elected from specific states, but the process of
lawmaking also provides opportunities for state and local
governments to assert their interests. 144 Wechsler's insights
reflect our Founders' understandings; they believed in the
virtues of federalism and established mechanisms to ensure a
voice for the states in Congress, such as the electoral college
system for presidential elections and the selection of Senators
from state legislatures. 145

141. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency Forcing"
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2128 (2009) (" [F)ederal agencies have become the real
decisionmakers [sic) in preemption controversies.").
142. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1 933, 1948 (2008).
143. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CO LUM. L. REV. 543, 558
(1954).
144. See id. at 543-44.
145. See Clark, supra note 138, at 194-95.
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Even though most of these structural features no longer
exist,146 the political safeguards of federalism are arguably
maintained today by the continued role of states in congressional
elections, lobbying by organizations that represent state
interests, the influence of state political party activists on federal
lawmakers, and Congress' s recognition that the states are
needed to carry out cooperative federal programs.147 In Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Supreme Court
explicitly
endorsed
Wechsler's
"political
safeguards
of
federalism" theory, stating that "the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. "148
Under this conception of the political landscape , Congress' s
parochial bias stands i n contrast t o the President' s national
perspective. As Wechsler described the President, he is "the
prime organ of a compensating 'national spirit"' who " speaks for
and represents the full national constituency."14 9 The model of
the President as a national figurehead supports expansive
interpretations of executive power, such as unitary executive
theory and j udicial deference to executive branch decisions.150 It
also suggests that the President's perch might enable him to
consider federalism benefits that are felt nationally, rather than
locally, because he can better "register the full intensity of the
public' s preferences"
than Congress.151 Indeed, Wechsler
asserted that the presidential electoral process makes the
president "responsive to local values that have large support
within the states." 152 Thus, under the "political safeguards of
federalism" theory, both political branches have incentives to
146. Id. at 196 (noting that pursuant to the Seventeenth Amendment, senators are no
longer appointed by state legislators, states have less control over voter qualifications
than they had at the Founding, and, in modern practice, presidential electors are selected
through "winner-take-all popular elections,'' rather than by state legislatures).
147. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 17, at 20-21 (summarizing the political
safeguards view and its detractors) . In addition, "the need to win votes from residents of
states and localities and the willingness to moderate policy positions, in order to do so
make federal officials less willing to limit state authority during election years." S.
Nicholson-Crotty, National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 38 PUBLIUS 295, 296 (2008).
148. 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (ruling that Congress has power under the commerce
clause to extend Fair Labor Standards Act to the state and local governments).
149. Wechsler, supra note 143, at 552.
150. See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2006); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1260 (2009).
151. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 772
(2004).
152. Wechsler, supra note 143, at 558.
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consider state interests, but the President tempers Congress' s
more parochial impulses. 153
Yet the political safeguards of federalism are disputed, with
commentators arguing that neither Congress nor the President is
politically accountable to state interests. For instance, while
members of Congress have incentives to cater to state and local
voters, they have nothing to gain from promoting the interests of
state institutions, which are their "political competitors. " 1 54 Jide
Nzelibe argues that similar parochial incentives motivate the
President, who focuses on delivering benefits to battleground
states, in order to woo enough swing votes to win the electoral
college . 155 This form of parochialism does not further the values
of federalism because only a few states get showered with
attention, which is sporadic at best. These competing theories on
the political safeguards of federalism suggest a stalemate. At
times, both political branches have electoral incentives to pay
attention to issues impacting the states, but neither seems overly
concerned with preserving federalism as a principled matter.
Indeed, both the President and Congress know that
implementing a states ' rights platform is unlikely to gamer votes.
While public opinion polls show that most voters share a belief
in a limited national government, 156 they actually end up
supporting an active role for the federal government when it
comes to substantive policy areas.1 57 Moreover, voters are not
interested in " abstract questions about the division of power. " 158
Not surprisingly then, politicians like to talk about states' rights,
but freely take actions inconsistent with those professed beliefs,

153. Professor John McGinnis adds that because the President's fortunes are
dependent on economic growth, he has incentives to enforce economic federalism that
congressional representatives lack because they "seek government action that is
advantageous for their state, even at the expense of the nation." John 0. McGinnis,
Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 903 (2001) .
154. Ernest Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 4 6 VILL. L . REV. 1349, 1358
(2001); see also Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back Into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 958-59 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 CO LUM. L. REV. 215, 293 (2000) .
155. Nzelibe, supra note 150, at 1248 ("The winner-take-all feature of the electoral
college shows that it will often be in the president's interests to target benefits at a small
group of voters at the expense of the rest of the population.").
156. See Kincaid & Cole, supra note 89, at 474-75 (stating that, in a 2007 poll, 66.1
percent of Americans said that "the federal government has too much power today,"
while only 4.7 percent said that state government had too much power).
157. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 296.
158. Neal Devins, The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same, 12
GREEN BAG 137, 137-38 (2009) (explaining why President Bush's conception of
executive power played no role in the 2008 presidential election).
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without fear of adverse electoral consequences. Indeed, while
Congress is often silent about preemption, a bevy of federal laws
contain preemption provisions, state mandates, and other
policies that limit state authority, suggesting that states' rights
are not a consistently overriding value for Congress in passing
the laws, or for the President in signing them.15 9 Further, due to
information costs, most voters do not know the particular
stances taken by their representatives in Congress , while
incumbents enjoy political advantages that make their stand on
the merits of specific issues often irrelevant.160 Thus, voters rarely
punish a congressperson solely for advancing federal interests.
Likewise, voters do not cast ballots based on how the
President acts on specific policy issues, such as preemption.
Rather, they elect someone who they consider like-minded, in
part, so they do not have to monitor the " quotidian decisions ,

complex j udgments, recondite bargains , and other actions" that
are "beyond their understanding and attention span. " 1 61
Moreover, the President makes many decisions that are invisible
to voters, while White House officials play a role in
governmental decisions that never get publicly attributed to the
President.162 Voters cannot reward or punish the President over
decisions that are obscured from their view; transparency and
accountability are linked. In short, both presidential and
congressional elections are poor mechanisms for voters to
express their views on specific policy issues, due to the number

of issues at stake in an election cycle and the limited number of
candidates. 163 As a result, while there are certainly instances in
which Congress and/or the President are responsive to state
concerns, it is difficult to conclude that one branch has greater
political incentives to cater to the states than the other.

159. See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 147, at 295; see also Zimmerman, supra note
54, at 445 ( "Congress continually restructures the balance of national-state powers in a
conceptual vacuum by enacting preemption statutes as ad hoc responses to problems." ) ;
Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 432 ( stating that President Bush approved 64 pieces of
legislation with preemption from 2001 to 2005 ) .
160. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1 979-80; Stanzewski, supra note 150,
at 1267.
161. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2078 (2005 ) .
162. See Stanzewski, supra note 150, at 1267.
163. Stanzewski, supra note 150, at 1270.
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Deliberation and Transparency

From a state's perspective, deliberation and transparency
appear to be Congress ' s main advantages over the President. To
begin with, it is far more cumbersome for Congress to act
because congresspersons have to form coalitions, whereas the
President can act unilaterally. Congressional lawmaking faces a
"maze of obstacles, " as bills must work their way through
multiple committees , subcommittees, floor votes in the House
and Senate , and intense negotiations to reach a form agreeable
in both houses - all the while fending off attacks by party
leaders,
rules committees,
filibusters,
holds,
and other
procedural roadblocks.1 64
Some argue that the slow and infrequent nature of federal
lawmaking furthers the political safeguards of federalism
because less legislation makes for less preemption. 165 By contrast,
William Eskridge contends that this unwieldy process does not
improve federalism; rather, it leads to "statutory complexity and
extensive delegation of lawmaking or law-elaborating
to agencies and sometimes courts. " 1 66 In short, the
"vetogates " inherent in the lawmaking process result in
not to decide, with Congress delegating policymaking
.
to th e agencies. 167

authority
multiple
decisions
authority

Once Congress delegates decision-making authority to an
agency, the President can, and sometimes does, step in to
influence a preemption decision.1 68 Yet, from a state 's
perspective, there are more opportunities and more access
points to provide input to Congress than to the President - as
long as the states are aware that preemption is on the
congressional agenda. To be sure , states can register their
opinions with the President, but this usually happens after an
unpopular preemption decision is made. For instance, in the case

of climate change, many states lashed out at President Bush's
refusal to regulate by issuing their own activist state-level
policies, suing the federal government, and keeping the issue

164. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral A ction,
15 J.L. ECON & ORG. 132, 146 ( 1999); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates,
Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 (2008).
165. See Clark, supra note 138, at 329-330.
166. Eskridge, supra note 164, at 1443.
167. Eskridge, supra note 164, at 1449. For this reason, Eskridge urges courts to use
the presumption against preemption to overcome these vetogates. Eskridge, supra note
164, at 1470-71.
168. See supra note 5 .
.

·
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burning in the forefront of public consciousness. 16 9 Similarly,
when President Clinton issued his preemption executive order
that appeared unfavorable to the states, they actively and
successfully organized to change his mind, and he responded. 170
However, these after-the-fact attacks can be costly to wage,
undermine stability, and face an uphill battle because it is usually
harder to dislodge a decision on the back end. (It is also worth
noting that even the improved Clinton executive order did not
impact agency decision-making. ) Thus, states are more likely to
influence the preemption debate if Congress is transparent in
putting preemption on its agenda than if the President directs
such an outcome unilaterally.
Moreover, states can only influence presidential decision
making if they know about it. While some Presidents promote
transparency, others obfuscate. The B ush Administration
generated distrust due to its secrecy. 171 For instance, when
Congress tried to investigate executive initiatives, the Bush
Administration consistently resisted congressional efforts to
subpoena documents about contacts between the White House
and agencies. 172 As for preemption, agencies began issuing
regulatory preambles purporting to preempt conflicting state
law, yet these preambles had never been subject to notice or
comment, and, in fact, the notices of some proposed rulemakings
misleadingly suggested that the agency was not considering
preemption at all, thereby foreclosing comments . 173 Further, due

to the Bush Administration' s culture of secrecy, it is difficult to
uncover President B ush' s role in preemption decisions-the
available evidence comes from leaks, statements made in
congressional hearings by agency insiders, and responses to
FOIA requests.
As a candidate , Obama promised a break from this pattern
and
pledged
"to
create
a
transparent
and connected
democracy. " 174 In his first year of office, he issued a stream of
memoranda and executive orders designed to make the
executive branch more open to public scrutiny, and to " usher in
a new era of open Government. " 175 Although such broad
169. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
171. See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration
and Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 529 (2009).
172. See id. at 531.
173. See Sharkey, supra note 82, at 254.
174. See Coglianese, supra note 171, at 529.
175. See Coglianese, supra note 171, at 533 (quoting Memorandum on the Freedom
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promises may backfire as he sets standards that are nearly
impossible (or undesirable) to meet, 1 76 Obama has established
different
expectations
about
transparency
and
greater
opportunities for public participation than his predecessor.
Clearly, the transparency of any given White House varies with
its holder.
By contrast, congressional transparency is more consistent
as an institutional matter, and less susceptible to the winds of
political will. Congress is " subject to a wider range of pluralist
voices and interest groups than any other political actor," and, as
a result, Congress gets better information to inform its decision
making than does the executive.1 7 7 States can-and do-monitor
proposed legislation that might usurp their authority, contact
their representatives to express their views, and rally other
interest groups in support or opposition to a bill. These are the
"informal, extraconstitutional" political safeguards of federalism
that operate today.1 78 State interests are organized into an
"intergovernmental
lobby,"
consisting
of
seven
main
organizations
of state
officials,
including
the
National
Governors' Association, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the National League of Cities, the National
Association
of
Counties,
the
International
City-County
Management Association, the U . S Conference of Mayors, and
the Council of State Governments. 1 79
Still, while congressional transparency and deliberation
appear necessary to secure political safeguards of federalism,
there will inevitably remain situations in which preemption
decisions will fall to the agencies. Even with the best of
intentions, Congress legislates ex ante and cannot always foresee
whether or how its laws may ultimately impact state-level
initiatives as circumstances change. 180 Moreover, even if a statute

of Information Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 9 (Jan. 21 , 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900009/pdf/DCPD-200900009.pdf) .
176. Coglianese, supra note 171, at 540.
177. Nzelibe, supra note 150, at 1222.
178. NUGENT, supra note 137, at 54.
179. See NUGENT, supra note 1 37, at 31, 1 18-120.
180. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
727, 754 (2008) ("Congress cannot anticipate when it legislates all the situations in which
questions of displacement will arise. "); Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, The
Problem of Federal Preemption: Toward a Formal Solution, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 219, 219 ("Congress cannot
possibly be expected to anticipate in advance or respond in timely fashion to all
conceivable ways in which states might attempt to intrude on federal policies."); Gillian
E. Metzger, A dministrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUI<E L.J. 2023, 2081 (2008)
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addresses preemption, the language can be ambiguous or
unclear, and agencies then have to decide how to proceed. As a
result, it is inevitable that agencies will have to make some
preemption decisions, and that Presidents will, therefore, have
occasion to direct that process. Accordingly, the next Section
discusses whether presidential involvement in agency decision
making enhances or detracts from federalism.
B. AGENCIES AND PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
Although most commentators agree that Congress should
decide whether or not to preempt state law, the reality is that,
due to broad congressional delegations, agencies make most
preemption decisions.181 This raises the question whether the
President's position as head of the executive branch enhances
the agency responsiveness to the states , as supporters of the pro
agency position assert. Furthermore, at least during the B ush
Administration, it appears the White House was directing some
agency outcomes, and, thus, the President' s role in preemption
needs to be considered. Does the President's direct participation
in agency decision-making further state autonomy such that
states would benefit from more or less presidential involvement?
The primary advocates for leaving federalism decisions
within the hands of agencies are B rian Galle and Mark
Seidenfeld, who reject the dominant scholarly preference for a
court-enforced presumption against preemption that would push
Congress to confront and decide federalism issues in the first
instance.182 Most scholars are dubious that agencies are suited to
making federalism decisions because they are staffed by
unelected bureaucrats and, thus, lack political accountability. By
contrast, Galle and Seidenfeld claim that this formalist position
ill-fits the modern regulatory state , in which the Supreme Court
has already justified deference to statutory interpretation by
agencies on the grounds of congressional delegation, agency
expertise, and the superior political accountability of the
President.183 They contend that agencies perform well on the
("Congress simply lacks the resources and foresight to resolve all the federalism issues
that can arise in a given regulatory scheme.").
181. See Metzger, supra note 180, at 2081 (" [T]he critical comparison is between
federal agencies and federal courts; given that Congress will delegate broadly."); Sharkey,
supra note 141, at 2128 ("[T]he federal agencies have become the real decisionmakers in
preemption controversies.").
182. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1939 (stating that agencies
outperform the other branches).
183. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1938 ("[C]laims of congressional
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benchmarks of deliberation, transparency, and democracy. 1 84 Yet
the Bush-era "preemption war" suggests that these values can be
undercut when the President steps in and directs substantive
regulatory outcomes.

1.

Transparency

As Galle and Seidenfeld assert, agencies are generally
transparent, which is an important component to good
governance. Transparency keeps citizens informed about
government activity, which, in turn, fosters opportunities for
input and political accountability. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, agencies must give notice and explanation of
proposed rules, provide opportunities for public comment, and
then publish final rules that explain the rule' s basis and pur� ose,
as well as the agency' s responses to submitted comments. 85 In
addition, a series of executive orders and federal statutes
promote transparency by requiring agencies to assess a variety of
regulatory impacts, such as cost-benefit analysis, effects on small
business,
paperwork
burdens,
alternatives
to
unfunded
mandates, and federalism. 186 Agencies are also subj ect to
sunshine laws that open agency meetings to the public, 187 and the
Freedom of Information Act, which gives private persons access
to government information. 18 8 Moreover, Galle and Seidenfeld
argue that it is easier for affected parties to access agency staff
members than to reach congresspersons; the latter are working
on a wider range of issues and spend the bulk of their time
focused on constituents. 18 9
Despite the formal mechanisms set-up to provide agency
transparency, presidential interference in agency decision
making can obscure the process. If the President is pulling the
levers behind the scenes, the public has no way to know who is
calling the shots and cannot lobby effectively for their interests.

primacy can be defended, we argue, only on formalist grounds.").
184. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1939.
185. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1 954-57.
186. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1957-58.
187. See Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West 2006)
(stating that agency meetings headed by collegial bodies must be open to the public);
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 77-76 (2006)
(stating that advisory committee meetings and minutes must be open to the public);
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (2006) (providing that
government personnel must disclose conflicts of interest) .
188. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2006).
189. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1958-59.
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Moreover, agency rationales can end up as post hoc
justifications, rather than legitimate reasoning. We have seen
that Presidents differ in their own commitments to transparency.
Whereas President Clinton publicly set agency agendas, and
then proudly sought to claim agency work as his own, President
B ush generally remained behind the curtains. President Obama
is now swinging the pendulum back to greater transparency.
Given these varied approaches to presidential administration, it
is hard to conclude that presidential administration fosters
transparency, as a rule.

2.

Deliberation

As for deliberation, agencies must provide meaningful
j ustifications for their rules and to evaluate alternatives . 1 90 As the
Supreme Court stated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

Association, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. , a rule will not survive j udicial review if it relies on factors

outside the statute, fails to consider important aspects of the
problem, offers an explanation that is contravened by the
evidence before the agency, or is " so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. " 1 91 Despite the incentives that this "hard look" review
imposes on agencies to engage in reasoned decision-making,
commentators disagree over whether agencies are institutionally
suited to consider federalism values. Galle and Seidenfeld argue
that agencies are immersed in the programs they administer,
and, thus, have the expertise to consider the "day-to-day impacts
that autonomous state regulators would have on a federal
program,"1 92 and "the extent to which � eographic variations
warrant different regulatory approaches. "1 9
Although Professor Nina Mendelson agrees that agencies
are good at evaluating program impacts, she states that they lack
the capacity to consider the values of " abstract federalism," 1 94
i.e., the interest in " preserving state prerogatives for their own
sake. " 195 As she explains, agencies are specialists in regulatory
programs, not generalists accustomed to considering federalism

190. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1 939.
191. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v . State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
192. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1972.
193. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1 977.
194. Mendelson, supra note 151, at 782.
195. Mendelson, supra note 151, at 781 .
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issues that are abstract or political, such as the costs of regulation
" upon a state' s dignity or a state 's function as a policy
'laboratory' or center of democratic activity."1 96 Further, agency
staffers are hired for their technical and scientific expertise, not
because they understand constitutional structure. 197
The President is in a good position to correct for this agency
weakness. In one account of the Presidency, the national
perspective of the President and the electoral process furnish
incentives for him to look out for state interests, while protecting
the "national commons from regional selfishness. " 19 8 Moreover,
the President can lean on the legal expertise within the Office of
Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General's Office in considering
abstract questions of federalism. 19 9 However, an alternative
account of the Presidency maintains that the President is far
more parochial than assumed because he must cater to voters in
battleground states in order to win re-election and further his
party's electoral successes.200 As an empirical matter, the conduct
of recent Presidents suggests that presidential regard for state
autonomy depends on the substantive policy at stake. Moreover,
even if the President is better able than agencies to weigh
abstract federalism values, he does not have the capacity to
monitor the entire output of the executive branch. Given the
thousands of agency decisions being made at any time and the
limited
personnel
capacity
of the
White
House,
the
Administration's
attention to regulatory issues is often
haphazard, sporadic, and inconsistent.201

196. Mendelson, supra note 151, at 781. As two commentators have noted,
" [f]ederalism criteria . . . do not have a natural home in agencies." Lazer & Mayer
Schoenberger, supra note 44, at 1 3 1 .
197. See Mendelson, supra note 151, a t 782. Acknowledging that agencies have a
programmatic focus, several commentators urge courts to make federalism part of hard
look review; that is, to push agencies to do a better job of considering federalism. See
Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1 978; William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look
Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational
Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2009) .
198. Steven G . Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 99 (1994) ; see also id. at 35 (describing the electoral process' impact on
the creation of presidential incentives).
199. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 682 (2005) (describing these offices as the
"principal constitutional interpreters for the executive branch").
200. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
201. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the A dministrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94-96
(2006).
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The President can best impact the bureaucracy's sensitivity
to federalism by working across the board, rather than
sporadically and unilaterally. As the head of the executive

branch, the President can require agencies to do a better j ob of
considering state interests. This does not require interference in
particular agency assessments; rather, the President can use
regulatory review to ensure that agencies consult with states ,
take state interests into account, and consider viable alternatives.
This is the model underlying the executive orders, which, if
enforced, could improve the dialogue surrounding preemption.

C. COURTS AND THE PRESIDENT
In 1992, the
Group, Inc. , that

Supreme Court ruled in Cippollone v. Liggett
a federal statute could preempt state common
law claims; that case held that FDA-mandated cigarette label
warnings preempted state tort actions for failure to warn of
smoking's dangers.202 Cippollone opened the door for regulated
industries to raise preemption defenses in tort litigation, and
made the courts increasingly central players in preemption
decisions. Notably, the B ush Administration pushed preemption
not only through agency rulemaking proceedings, but also
through its litigation positions and amicus briefs in support of
businesses seeking to preempt state tort law. For Presidents, the
j udiciary is one of many tools for advancing a federalism agenda.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's' preemption doctrine is a
muddled one,203 with no "predictable j urisprudential or analytical
pattern, "204 and this flux provides leeway for the President to
exert influence over federal preemption. Accordingly, this
Section considers how presidential politics impact
doctrines of j udicial review in the preemption context.

existing

Given that Congress often fails to speak clearly about
preemption, and that agencies step in as gap fillers, many
commentators believe that the federal courts are the onl
�
realistic bulwark against federal intrusions into state interests.2 5
Scholars have articulated two maj or competing visions for how
courts should approach preemption decisions. The majority view

202. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
203. MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 107-08.
204. Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000).
205. See e.g. , sources cited supra note 137. Congress can also create confusion when it
enacts both a preemption clause and a savings clause, "which purports not to upend
existing state common law liability." Catherine Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA
Preemption of State Products Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 438 (2009).
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is that courts should enforce the presumption against
preemption to compel Congress to wrestle with and resolve
federalism issues.
The Supreme Court first articulated the presumption in Rice
stating that it " start[ s] with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. "206 In this view, Congress is
the best institutional actor for making federalism decisions, but
the courts need to push Congress to do its j ob. As noted earlier,
congressional decision-making is said to foster deliberation,
create opportunities for state input, comply with constitutional
lawmaking requirements, and put the onus on regulated
industries to lobby for and obtain favorable preemption
prov1s10ns. 201 M oreover,
too much d e ference to agency
preemption decisions is dangerous because agencies can
completely subsume a regulatory field, leaving the "sole
enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime entirely
concentrated within a single, overworked "20 8 agency, and
substituting "public for private enforcement of the law. "20 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court enforces the presumption
against preemption rarely and inconsistently.210

v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. ,

•

•

Accordingly, another group of scholars argue that courts
should (and sometimes do) use administrative law doctrine, such
as hard look review, to ensure that agencies adequately consider
state interests. For instance, Catherine Sharkey would have
courts "look to the regulatory record to determine whether or
not an agency actually considered the risks that the state law
attempts to protect against, " rather than the agency's formal

206.
207.

331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

Detractors argue that the presumption can disrupt the "constitutional division
of power between federal and state governments,'' Dinh, supra note 204, at 2092, and
permit courts to engage in "under the table constitutional lawmaking,'' that tilts the field
away from preemption, even when preemption is warranted, Verchick & Mendelson,
supra note 17, at 23 ( quoting William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 635 (1992)).
208. Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE
QUESTION, supra note 17, at 1 1 9, 141.
209. Sharkey, supra note 82, at 248.
210. See Sharkey, supra note 205, at 439; Hills, supra note 138, at 60 ( stating that the
Court has "frequently honored" the presumption by "abandoning it, finding an intent to
preempt even without anything remotely like 'clear and manifest' evidence of such
intent" ) .
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statements about preemption.2 11 Gillian Metzger highlights how
administrative law operates as a check on agency capture,
politicization, and self-aggrandizement,2 12 while simultaneously
giving states opportunities for notice and participation when
their interests are at stake. These agency-first approaches would
arguably minimize j udicial interference with congressional
prerogatives, allow regulatory experts to assess the impact of
federal programs on the states, and give agencies incentives to
consider state interests.
Thus, the main debate is whether the courts should push
Congress or agencies to better consider federalism. 2 13 If courts
vigorously enforced the presumption against preemption,
agencies would not be able to preempt without express
congressional permission. As a result, the President's role in
preemption decisions would diminish, although he might be
spurred to sponsor, influence, and veto proposed legislation in
line with his preemption goals. The presumption against
preemption would limit the benefits that come from a
President's national perspective, but would protect states from
unilateral decision-making.214 This is an argument in favor of the
presumption against preemption that scholars have overlooked.
By contrast, if the courts used administrative law to police
agency factual and policy decisions, the President could maintain
a central role in preemption, which has plusses and minuses
depending on the model of presidential oversight. Courts would
have to decide how presidential involvement impacts Chevron
deference (for review of agency statutory interpretation) and
hard look review (for review of agency policy decisions). On the
one hand, presidential involvement might suggest greater

211.
212.

Sharkey, supra note 205, at 442.
Metzger, supra note 180, at 2083.
213. A third approach would put courts more solidly in the driver's seat in resolving
federalism problems. Thomas Merrill advocates that courts should develop "a substantive
conception of those areas of regulation in which uniform rules of federal law should
prevail and those areas in which diverse state standards and approaches should be
allowed to flourish." Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism,
Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS,
NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 166-167. Thus, Merrill has attempted to develop
a taxonomy of default rules that apply to different categories of cases when Congress is
silent or ambiguous, based on experience with how "federalism values have played out in
the past in particular areas." Id. at 169. This has been criticized as unrealistic as a
"Herculean task" for the judiciary. Hills, supra note 138, at 6.
214. The presumption against preemption (Congress must decide) bumps up against
Chevron deference (defer to agency decisions), which is a tension the Supreme Court has
not resolved. See Scott Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal
Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 76 (2008).
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democratic accountability; on the other hand , it heightens the
risk that an agency is acting for purely political motives.
Professor Katherine Watts urges courts to openly acknowledge
the politics inherent in agency decision-making, and to separate
"pure partisanship or raw politics" from situations "where the
political factors seek to implement policy considerations or value
judgments tied in some sense to the statutory scheme being
implemented . " 2 15 This line is blurry. However, charting it would
allow courts to assess preemption without pretending that
presidential politics are not part of the calculus, while
simultaneously restricting overly political j udgments. Even
better, if the President enforced the federalism executive order
through O IRA oversight, he would enhance the courts' ability to
conduct preemption hard look review because rulemaking
records would contain an agency's analysis of how federal
regulations impact state law, the extent of consultation with state
officials, and the benefits and costs of alternative strategies.
Bringing presidential involvement into the sunshine would
also enhance political accountability due to " [t]he Presidency's
unitary power structure, its visibility, and its 'personality' [which]
render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that
the public can identify and evaluate. "21 6 Presidents can also offer
a broader view than agencies see from their specialized perches.
Further, if presidential preemption was pushed underground, an
administration dedicated to secrecy could still exercise its
political muscle behind closed doors. Agencies could act as
fronts for White House decisions and be awarded Chevron
deference for their stealth. So, if presidents are going to be
involved in preemption, it should be transparent. Yet
transparency alone is not enough. From a state perspective, too
much presidential control could limit the benefits of regulatory
expertise that agencies provide, raise concerns about presidential
" capture" by powerful interest groups, and limit opportunities
for state input because the President is far less accessible than
agency staff or congresspersons. Accordingly, the challenge for
the j udiciary is to harness the desirable aspects of presidential
involvement in preemption decision-making, while restraining its
abuses.

215. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in A rbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 56 (2009).
216. Kagan, supra note 28, at 2332.
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D . WHO DECIDES ?
As this Part demonstrates, each institutional actor has
differing incentives and attributes when it comes to protecting
federalism. Although there are many theoretical assumptions
about which actor best preserves federalism, the reality is that all
of them play a role in making federalism decisions. Ideally,
Congress would make all preemption decisions; it is the
institutional actor charged with lawmaking, and its processes are
transparent and allow for public participation. However, the
reality is that Congress does not, and sometimes cannot not,
make ex ante preemption determinations.
Thus, many
preemption decisions get left to agencies under the President's
supervision. Under the B ush Administration, the White House
pushed a uniform policy of preemption and appears to have
directed agencies to preempt state laws and regulations, even in
situations where the outcome might otherwise have been
different.21 1 The President's role in preemption has not been an
issue in preemption litigation. However, courts might see two
sides to presidential involvement. Presidential control over
preemption can bring democratic accountability and better
coordination to agency decisions. At the same time, presidential
meddling might undermine the reasoned explanation that hard
look review demands of agencies by substituting politics for
reason. In the end, the type of presidential involvement is more
important than the fact of his involvement. As the next Part
argues, the Obama-managerial approach appears more likely to
foster federalism than the B ush-unitary approach.
III. THE PRESIDENT AND PREEMPTION
Although all three branches of federal government have a
role in maintaining federalism, the President has several unique
attributes that could be harnessed to promote state autonomy.
As overseer of the entire federal bureaucracy, he can coordinate
programs across agencies, reduce overlap and waste, centralize
review and oversight, and adapt quickly to changes in the
regulatory landscape. Although presidential incentives vary, the
President has the power to make federalism considerations a

217. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, l lOTH CONG.,
FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES ii (Comm. Print
2008) ("At least one document suggests that the White House played a significant role in
the preemption provisions and pressured the agency to reject the concerns of career
experts.").
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priority across the executive branch, if he so wishes. The
question remains, however, as to how he should exercise his
power to effect federal-state relations. Should the President be a
dec1' d er or a manager ?. 2 18
This question gets to the controversy over directory
authority, i . e . , whether the President has the power to direct
agency outcomes, or whether his role involves management of
the executive branch. Article II of the Constitution vests
executive power in the President, but it only loosely describes

the scope and extent of that power in the domestic sphere.2 19 It
gives the President the authority to appoint "officers " of the
United States and to "require the opinion, in writing" of those
officers.220 B eyond those specifications, Article II commands the
President to " take care that the laws be faithfully executed. "221
The history surrounding the take care clause sheds little light on
this language, probably because the Framers, themselves,
disagreed over the proper scope of executive power.222 For its
part, the . Supreme Court has given varying and irreconcilable
support to both views of the Presidency, without resolving the
issue, and, thus, directory authority remains an open question.

Under President B ush, the White House directed specific
outcomes in service of a pro-business agenda that advanced
preemption across federal agencies. The strategy was effective
and entirely consistent with the unitary executive theory that
defined the B ush Presidency. By contrast, early indications are
that President Obama is acting more as a manager, trying to
enhance federal-state relations by making agencies do a better
j ob of consulting and coordinating with the states. These are
competing models of presidential administration with differing
consequences for preemption.

218. Cary Coglianese states that is a dichotomy without a difference, because "one
person's 'oversight' will be another person's 'decision;"' moreover, the extent of
presidential involvement is generally unknown to the public (or courts), and can always
be covered by agency administrators. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of
Administrative Agencies, A Debate Over Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 646
(2010).
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.").
220. Id. § 2.
221. Id. § 3.
222. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755
(1996) (describing the narrative of the founding as revealing "at the most general level
people groping . . . toward a workable conception of government from which only broad
purposes can safely be inferred.").
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Under unitary executive theory, the President is at the apex
of the executive branch; agency officials serve at his pleasure;
and, thus, the President can direct how agencies exercise their
delegated powers.223 As Professors Calabresi and Yoo explain,
" [a]11 subordinate nonlegislative and nonjudicial officials
exercise executive power . . . only by implicit or explicit
delegation from the president. "224 In this view, agencies are
delegates of the President, rather than of Congress, "irrespective
of Congress' s choice of delegate. "225 Unitarians point to the
Framers' intent "to construct a unitary Executive since they felt
it was conducive to energy, dispatch, and responsibility. "226 In
light of the growth of the modern administrative state, the
unitary executive fosters accountability and efficiency because
only the President is situated to oversee the vast and complex
federal bureaucracy.227
In contrast, non-unitarians view agencies as the delegates of
Congress, rather than instruments of the Executive. They take a

different view of history, in which the Framers "believed that the
President would be a managerial agent for the legislature rather
than an independent source of domestic policy. "22 8 Further,
concentration of power within the Executive runs counter to the
Framers' goal of avoiding t�ranny by balancing and dispersing
power among the branches.2 9 The Framers wanted to make "the
machinery of government somewhat cumbersome , thus ensuring
against the hegemony of one branch or person. "230 In the
managerial view, accountability arises from multiple institutions

223. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law
in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1 107-08 (2008)
(describing unitary executive theory and its relationship to the administrative state).
224. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER s. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008).
225. Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B U. L. REV. 523,
525 (2008) (criticizing unitary executive theory).
226. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 , 639 ( 1994).
227. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105-06 (1994); Kagan, supra note 28, at 2252. Cynthia Farina
explains the appeal of unitary executive theory: it "responds powerfully to the
uncertainty and overwhelming complexity of modern life." Cynthia Farina, False Comfort
and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 372 (2010) .
228. Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control
of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 202-03
(1981) .
229. See Flaherty, supra note 222, at 1741.
230. Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 123, 177 ( 1994) .
.
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and inputs, rather than from a unilateral actor, and the
President's efficiency is best harnessed when he improves and
refines regulatory processes.
President Bush conducted his Presidency consistently with
the unitary executive theory, and the preemption issue is only
one of many examples of fidelity to that theory. Yet it is
questionable whether the unitary executive furthered the values

of accountability and efficiency when it comes to preemption.
Unitary executive theorists argue that presidential decision
making advances accountability because the President has a
broad, national perspective, one not shared by bureaucrats who
operate within the narrow zone of their expertise.23 1 Moreover,
most bureaucrats are unelected and hidden from view, while the
President is directly accountable to the entire electorate.232 Thus,
the President is in the best position to consider how policy
decisions will play out on a national stage. And, if citizens are
unhappy with his decisions , they can punish or reward him at the
ballot box.

However, it is questionable whether the President is
politically accountable for agency decisions because most
governmental decisions are not on the radar screen of voters.233
Moreover, it can be hard for voters to trace the source of
administrative decision-making, particularly when the when the
White House distances itself from bureaucrats' actions. Consider

the preemption decisions of the B ush era. Due to a lack of
transparency, the President was not publicly connected with the
"preemption war . " Even though some of his political appointees
were the public faces of preemption, it is unlikely that voters
would punish the President at the ballot box for the complex
controversies over FDA device labeling or CPS C mattress
standards. As Heidi Kitrosser has pointed out, a unitary
executive "lends itself to a President who can publicly distance
himself from unpopular actions of the administrative state, but
who has substantial power secretly to influence the same. " 234
The most important factors for voters in the 2000 and 2004
presidential elections were party affiliation, foreign policy, and

231. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395, 1405-06 (1 975) (noting that regulation often involves political choices,
rather than solely technical decisions).
232. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1742
(2009) (summarizing unitary executive theory).
233. See Farina, supra note 227, at 377-84 (explaining why the President does not
represent voter preferences).
234. Kitrosser, supra note 232, at 1765.

380

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.

26:339

economic priorities.235 Even the most ardent supporters or
vehement opponents of the President' s preemption policies 
those who single-handedly voted on a state ' s rights platform,
alone-probably could not have impacted these elections.
In pushing preemption, President B ush did not purport to
mirror public preferences, but, rather, was advancing the
interests of an important group of his constituents. Tort reform
was an important goal to President B ush, who was supported by
business throughout his campaigns and presidency, and who had
a business background, himself. He believed that tort litigation
was imposing undue costs on society, and that preemption was a
way to rein in state tort lawsuits. Just as agencies are subj ect to
interest group capture, the President is, as well. Here, the
President did not act as a check on that capture, but, instead,
reinforced it. Moreover, to the degree that state tort lawsuits and
regulatory schemes serve as an independent check on agency
capture, the President' s preemption policy removed that
restraint, as well. Once the President made the preemption call,
state opportunities for notice and comment before agencies and
courts were meaningless. Indeed, in many instances, agencies
preempted state law by preamble, thus stripping the public of
notice and comment opportunities, altogether. The unitary
executive thus can undermine accountability by " replac[ing]
multiple identifiable avenues for public input and information
access with a single, instrinsically opaque and relatively
inaccessible formal decision maker. "236
By contrast, President Obama' s preemption memorandum
appears to be consistent with a managerial approach to the
executive branch, in which accountability arises from transparent
decision-making, policy dialogue and opportunities for input,
and "flexibility in the value structure of bureaucratic decision
making."237 Agency decision-making generally conforms to this
vision of accountability because agencies study external scientific
and technical research, conduct their own research, are subject
to sunshine laws, provide public notice of their proposed
decisions, accept public comment on proposed rules, hold
stakeholder and regional meetings, and have regular direct

235. See D. Sunshine Hillygus & Todd G. Shields, Moral Issues and Voter Decision
Making in the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 201 , 207 (2005).
236. Kitrosser, supra note 232, at 1743.
237. PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 166 (2009).
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interaction with the public.238 Agencies "gather more public input
and receive more public scrutiny" than the President, and are
also subj ect to j udicial review.239 Despite these mechanisms,
agencies have been insufficiently attentive to state interests and
clearly need a push from an outside institutional actor. The
President is ideally suited to give that push.
In this regard, the efficiency and energy that attach to the
Office of the President make him an ideal player for improving

preemption decision-making. As unitary executive theorists
point out, the President is uniquely situated to coordinate efforts
across the federal bureaucracy.240 In The Federalist, Alexander
Hamilton articulated this idea: "Energy in the executive is a
leading character in the definition of good government. "241 A
modern perspective links presidential control with "a number of
so-called technocratic values : cost-effectiveness , consistency, and
rational priority-setting. "242 Thus, the notion of efficiency
captures the benefits attached to a single, national leader 
particularly as a way to counter the sprawl of the administrative
state.
President Bush's preemption policies were arguably
"efficient" in that they were coordinated q uickly across the
federal bureaucracy. However, the B ush model of efficiency has
its costs . The attribute of efficiency is particularly compelling in
foreign affairs, where the United States needs to speak with a
single voice, and in times of emergency, where executive delay
can have tragic costs.243 However, these special circumstances do
not arise in connection with most administrative decisions.
Efficiency needs to be balanced with other constitutional values,
such as democratic participation and non-arbitrariness. The
managerial model accommodates these values by making
agencies do a better j ob of carrying out statutory commands,
while also giving states a voice in decisions that impact their
regulatory prerogatives.

238. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 201 , at 80-83.
239. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 201 , at 83.
240. See Calabresi, supra note 198, at 37-38.
241 . THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
242. Kagan, supra note 28, at 2339.
243. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch From Within, 1 15 YALE L.J. 2314, 2326 (2006) (noting the need for
executive dispatch in certain circumstances, but warning that this "should not preclude ex
post examination of executive conduct by agencies sharing jurisdiction").
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The managerial view animates the federalism executive
orders and President Obama' s federalism memorandum. These
presidential directives do not mandate any particular substantive
outcome regarding preemption; rather, they are aimed at making
agencies more attuned to state interests. They are intended to
supervise, rather than supplant.244 A managerial approach is
ideally suited for preemption issues because it encourages
transparency and deliberation at the agency level. And the more
a President becomes publicly linked with a commitment to
federalism values, the more stakeholders can hold him
accountable if agencies fail to live up to their end of the bargain.
From the states' perspective, this managerial approach gives
them opportunities to provide input to federal agencies, and to
haggle and negotiate with agencies as part of the federal-state
regulatory dance.
Commentators have come up with ideas to strengthen

federalism review even further. With the goal of promoting state
level regulation to foster economic growth, John McGinness
would limit federal regulation to situations when "interstate
externalities or spillovers suggest that federal regulation is
necessary," narrow the clear statement requirements to "those
areas in which preemption would undercut j urisdictional
competition," and provide j udicial review to ensure that agencies
comply with the executive order.245
With the goal of protecting public health and safety, another
group of scholars urge the President to revise the executive
order to recognize that "federal and state governments play a
cooperative role in setting public policy," rather than defining
federalism as a limit on governmental power.246 They also
recommend a presumption against ceiling preemption, a
requirement that agencies differentiate between state common
law and state positive law, and discouragement of implied
preemption.247 To achieve these objectives, they suggest greater

244. See Krent, supra note 225, at 547 ( describing the managerial view in previous
presidential administrations) .
245. McGinnis, supra note 153, at 944; see also McGinnis, supra note 153, at 944-52
( explaining how his account would limit federal regulation) .
246. WILLIAM BUZBEE ET AL. , CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE
TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: RETHINKING REGULATORY PREEMPTION AND ITS IMPACT
ON
PUBLIC
HEALTH
15
( 2009 ) ,
http://progressivereform. org/articles/
RethinkingPreemption902.pdf.
247. Id. at 16-17.
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scrutiny from OMB ; currently, agencies simply certify their
compliance with the executive order.248
These differing goals and suggestions reveal that even a
managerial approach to executive branch administration can
embody value judgments about federalism and the proper role
of government, with substantive policy goals in mind. No form of
executive administration can be value-neutral, and we do not
expect our President to be impartial in executing the law. After
all, he was elected for articulating and representing a particular
agenda. Presidents are allowed to put their stamp on agency
output as they "take care" to ensure that the "laws are faithfully
executed. " Overseeing the executive branch, however, is
different than deciding unilaterally how to apportion federal and
state power. B oth sets of federalism review suggestions above
leave room for agency deliberation and state input, even if they
are animated by differing obj ectives. Dialogue and debate about
the proper scope of federalism are, themselves, part of the
federal-state balance, and the President is an important figure in
ensuring this debate continues.
CONCLUSION
During the B ush Administration, the White House
orchestrated an effective tort reform strategy to protect industry
by directing federal agencies to preempt state law in areas such
as public health, consumer protection, and the environment.
Preemption
has
advantages
and
disadvantages,
usually
depending on where one stands. For corporations, it lessens
potential liability and provides uniform compliance standards.
As a federalism matter, however, it diminishes the sovereignty of
the states and limits their ability to act as policymakers. On an
individual level, . it can strip inj ured citizens of the ability to seek
compensation for negligent industry practices.
A decision to preempt requires balancing a complex
calculus of factors, including scrutiny of the statutory scheme at
issue, the technical and/or scientific aspects of the regulatory
program, the consequences for federalism, and the substantive
goals of stakeholders. The B ush Administration "preemption
war , " however, appeared to short-circuit this analysis. Shortly
after taking office, President Obama reversed course on
preemption, instructing agencies to comply with Executive

248.

Id. at 1 8-20.
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Order 13, 132, which requires agencies to respect the
policymaking prerogatives of the states by limiting preemption,
unless there is clear evidence that Congress intends to preempt
state law. This does not mean that agencies will never preempt
state law; rather, they must conduct a federalism analysis and
seek feedback from the states in making preemption decisions.
The contrast between the Bush and Obama Administrations
with regard to preemption tracks two differing models of the
Presidency. The B ush approach is modeled on unitary executive
theory, in which the President is empowered to direct agencies
to achieve the President' s substantive goals. This approach can
be efficient, but because it is unilateral, it cuts the states and
other stakeholders out of the decision-making process. By
contrast, President Obama is taking a managerial approach to
agency oversight. He is steering the agencies to do a better j ob in
considering federalism, but he is not overtly mandating any
particular outcome. The managerial model respects agency
expertise, allows for state input into the regulatory process,
encourages deliberation, and provides greater transparency to
the work of federal agencies. For these reasons, it provides more
robust protection for federalism values than a unitary executive
model. Time will tell whether these benefits of the managerial
approach to preemption are realized, but it is a promising start.

